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Current literature in the fields of political science and communication exhibit
confusion over the existence and effect of corporate influence on a newspaper’s
daily transactions. Does newspaper ownership affect content? Previous research
answers this question “yes,” “no,” and “maybe.” I conduct a longitudinal, time
series study across 1,366 newspapers and nearly 30 years to answer the question of
whether newspaper ownership affects the papers’ presidential campaign
endorsements in election years. With demographics data and vote returns as well
as newspaper ownership and endorsement information, this study looks at
newspaper consolidation and the effect of ownership on endorsements. The results
shed light on the current confusion. Changing ownership has a partisan effect on
endorsements: Ownership change causes a newspaper to endorse the Republican
presidential candidate but has no effect on a newspaper’s likelihood of endorsing a
Democratic candidate.
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INTRODUCTION

Stories abound about the horrors of media consolidation and the limits
imposed on the marketplace of ideas when large corporations own most media
outlets. As media outlets proclaim their own deaths, large companies like the
32-paper Knight-Ridder Company have been bought out by other conglomerates;
Knight-Ridder was purchased by the McClatchy Company for $4.5 billion in 2006
(Folkenflik, 2006). Only a handful of two-newspaper cities still exist in the U.S. as
the number of media outlets has been diminished by mergers and corporate
consolidations; the Rocky M ountain N ews closed its doors in early 2009
(Bagdikian, 2000). It was followed weeks later by the final print edition of the
Seattle P ost − Intelligencer, leaving Seattle and Denver one-newspaper towns.
Corporate mergers and consolidation could affect media content in two
possible ways. Diminished competition from newspaper attrition due to mergers
and normal business loss could mean newspapers have less incentive to get the
story first, get it right and get it best; getting the story at all could be enough to
keep readership if there is no other outlet competing for reader interest. Corporate
consolidation could also affect newspapers’ interests and editorial decision-making
processes. Anecdotal evidence suggests some crotchety or colorful media company
owners have imposed their ideals and opinions on newspapers under their purview
(Freivogel, 2010; Herman and Chomsky, 1988). If there is widespread evidence of
changing editorial patterns based on ownership, this could call media
independence into question.
Less independent ownership and fewer owners could means fewer voices
writing about the interests of the average media consumer. As large corporations
form even larger groups through mergers and sales, political economists fear that
corporate interests will trump individual interests in newspapers’ profit schemes
1

(Bagdikian, 2000). This hue and cry raises a question addressed to some extent by
political science literature, with conflicting results: Does changing ownership
actually affect the political content of an individual newspaper? Anecdotes abound
and some qualitative studies exist to answer this question, but few large-scale
studies have been attempted.
This research attempts to answer this question and incidentally offers new
insight into the topic of ownership consolidation. The study will proceed first with
an overview of existing research on ownership consolidation and its effect on
newspaper content, followed by an outline of the research design, theory and
hypotheses. Finally, I will describe my data analysis and results and offer a
conclusion with suggestions for future research. The current study brings new
resources to bear on the discussion of ownership effects on the political content of
newspapers. Previous research focused primarily on small, qualitative studies of
individual newspapers and looked at patterns of changing content allocation or,
more rarely, presidential endorsements (Wackman et al., 1975). This research
examines broad patterns in newspaper endorsements across the country using a a
partially new dataset. I coded ownership information over a 30-year span for every
English-language daily newspaper in the U.S. Pairing this with previously collected
data on presidential endorsements and county-level demographics and vote turnout
information, I achieve a systematic, broad look at the effect of changing ownership
on changing opinion page ideology measured by presidential endorsements.

2

CHAPTER 1
CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AND LOCAL CONTENT

Though this study is concerned primarily with the potential effects of
ownership on content, political science and communication literature typically
identify three potential sources of bias, each of which have some relevance to this
study. Each of these sources of bias has different implications on a newspaper’s
content, including the presidential endorsements of the paper. Content is produced
either to satisfy the consumer (Hamilton, 2004; Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2006), to
satisfy the owner (Bagdikian, 2000; Demers, 1996; Shoemaker and Reese, 1991), or
to satisfy the newspaper’s own staff (Page, 1996; Baron, 2006). If content is
produced to satisfy the consumer, an economic transaction is presumed to take
place between a newspaper’s readership and its staff, resulting in a product with
the type of content – particularly the type of conservative or liberal political slant
– that the readership wishes to consume, typically close to its own bias. If this
argument were true, research would show that the political ideology of a
newspaper is typically close to the political ideology of its readership. If content is
produced to satisfy the owner, the argument is that corporate political interests,
driven either by owners’ individual ideology or by business interests in general, are
the driving factor in a newspaper’s political slant in news and opinion coverage. In
this case, one would see individual newspapers exhibiting political ideology similar
to that expressed by their owners (which has been measured through campaign
contributions). And if content is produced to satisfy internal standards set by the
newspaper’s staff, this would mean that political slant is determined by the
editors’ and reporters’ desires to meet standards of objectivity and professionalism.
In this case one might expect to see a less biased newspaper as reporters
traditionally value objectivity – or one typifying the political ideology of the
3

reporters themselves.
Since research suggests that ownership has been consolidating over the past
20 to 30 years, the potential effects of ownership on political ideology are worth
investigating. Ownership consolidation leading to mass changes in political
ideology could lead to changes in the American electorate if it means the media
market is less (or more) diversified in opinion. One mechanism by which ownership
could affect coverage is economically driven. Chomsky and Herman argue that
mass ownership of the media represents the “first filter” through which
information must pass before it can be consumed by the mass public. Because
newspapers require so much investment to get off the ground, papers are
automatically biased toward conglomerate ownership. Because large newspaper
owners are integrated into the stock market, the companies have outside pressure
to maintain a profit, thus potentially skewing coverage (Herman and Chomsky,
1988). If newspaper owners exercise control over content there are potentially
problematic implications for media consumers, since research also supports the
claim that newspaper owners are consolidating and fewer companies own more
newspapers now than in the past (Bagdikian, 2000). Some research suggests that
the marketplace of ideas is diminishing as owners consolidate (Bagdikian, 2000).
However, current studies addressing the effect of the diminished marketplace on
newspaper content present mixed results with no consensus on whether or not
newspaper owners have an effect on content (Gilens and Hertzman, 2000; Rystrom,
1987; Busterna and Hansen, 1989).
Ownership consolidation in recent years has been a given precursor to
research on content effects. Many studies have examined the effect of ownership on
news content, opinion content, types of stories run, amount of local coverage and
other things without addressing the underlying question of whether ownership
consolidation happens. Some other research has examined consolidation
4

specifically, looking at things like corporate ownership versus family ownership
(Bagdikian, 2000). Typifying the consolidation research are Bagdikian (2000) and
Compaine and Gomery (2000). Compaine and Gomery find that newspaper
ownership had concentrated a great deal between 1923 and 1998 (Compaine and
Gomery, 2000). Bagdikian (2000) also finds support for ownership consolidation
among media companies. McChesney and Schiller (2003) catalogues media
ownership consolidation since 1980. George (2007) bases a study on the claim that
“the 1990s saw a sharp increase in newspaper mergers and acquisitions.” Gilens
and Hertzman (2000) likewise premise a study on the existence of consolidation
and corporate ownership. These studies taken together are evidence that the
political science and communications field currently treats ownership consolidation
as more fact than discussion topic, and hence a safe assumption on which to
premise future research.
The question currently of interest in the literature is not so much “if”
ownership consolidation happens, but “so what?” Does that ownership
consolidation affect newspaper content? And what sections are affected? Here the
literature is much less definitive.
A cluster of studies examined changes in news content after consolidations or
mergers. Some of these studies are cross-sectional comparison studies, looking at
several newspapers within a company or a certain type of coverage across
companies when newspapers are acquired. Others look at different newspapers’
coverage of a specific event that might reasonably be affected by competing
corporate interests. Glasser et al. (1989) found that Knight-Ridder papers were
more likely to downplay coverage of a scandal related to another company
newspaper. Lacy (1991) found that group ownership affected the amount of space
local newspapers devoted to news and editorial space allotment. Coulson and
Hansen (1995) examined the Louisville Courier − Journal’s news coverage before
5

and after a Gannett buyout, making several discoveries they claim negatively
affect newspaper quality for the readership. They find that the paper’s average
news story got shorter after the 1988 buyout (a finding the authors link to
Gannett’s competition with television audiences), the percentage of hard news
stories in the paper declined, and the number of wire stories increased more
quickly than the number of locally-written stories. These are all typically seen as
signs of poor quality in the news industry. Gilens and Hertzman (2000) examine
newspaper coverage of the 1996 Telecommunications Act and find that reporting is
biased based on newspaper ownership. The act loosened restrictions on television
station ownership in the U.S. Thus, newspaper companies with joint holdings in
broadcast media stood to gain by passage of the act, while media companies with
solely print ownership had less at stake in the issue. The authors find that
newspapers owned by companies with joint holdings carried significantly more
positive coverage of the act than companies without broadcast holdings. Milyo
(2007) examined the effect of ownership on local content and political slant of local
television stations. The story here seems to be that ownership can have an effect.
These studies imply that ownership has an effect, and it is generally a “negative”
one, on the hard news side of newspaper content. Corporate interests complicate
the news standards of reporters and editors and can cause newspaper staff to
address coverage in a more biased and less careful way than they otherwise would.
Alternatively, Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010) find ownership consolidation
uncorrelated with newspaper ideology in their measurement of newspaper slant
(based on owner ideology created from political donation information). The field
still exhibits confusion. Moreover, no one has addressed the topic from the
perspective of a longitudinal and cross-sectional study including all
English-language daily newspapers in the U.S. Is there a quantifiable effect of
ownership change on the acquired newspapers across time and newspapers? None
6

of these studies addresses that question.
Opinion page content is another likely candidate to be affected by changing
ownership. A newspaper’s opinion page is typically compiled by an opinion editor
or editorial staff that decides what content to include, including what topic to
address in a staff editorial representing staff opinion, what columns to include by
syndicated and local columnists and what letters to the editor the newspaper will
choose to print on a given day. Opinion page editors enjoy varying amounts of
autonomy and discretion depending on the size of the newspaper, the individual
paper’s editorial hierarchy and potentially dependent on ownership demands. For
instance, a former opinion page editor for the St. Louis P ost − Dispatch vividly
remembered the days when a former editor, Joseph Pulitzer III, would require his
newspapers (including the P ost − Dispatch) to endorse a particular candidate for
president – because Mr. Pulitzer liked him (Freivogel, 2010).
Several studies have worked to quantify this problem, examining the effects of
ownership consolidation on newspaper opinion content with various methods.
Wackman et al. (1975) studied presidential endorsements and found in an analysis
over four election periods that chain newspapers – newspapers owned by a
company that owned at least two other newspapers – were more likely to endorse a
candidate for president than were non-chain papers. Chain papers that did
endorse typically had a high rate of homogeneity, endorsing the same candidate as
their peers with the same owner. Because of this, the researchers raised concern
about pressure from peers or managers within owner groups. Entman (1985)
studied newspapers in monopoly markets, newspapers with the same owner and
competing markets and competitive newspapers with different owners, and found
that competition didn’t do much to increase diversity of opinion among the papers
he studied. Rystrom (1987) found that group-owned newspapers were likely to be
more liberal in presidential and other political endorsements than independent
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newspapers. Busterna and Hansen (1989) found that chain newspaper ownership
had little effect on presidential endorsements. A study of editorial page content
Demers (1996) found that corporately owned newspapers ran more letters to the
editor, columns and staff editorials, included more local content in the writing, and
were more likely to criticize “mainstream” groups. In other words, by typical
standards of opinion page content, corporation-owned papers produced a
higher-quality product. Ho and Quinn (2009) create a composite measure of
newspaper ideology from newspaper editorials on Supreme Court decisions. They
use this measure to test corporate influence on newspaper opinion pages, finding
some evidence that ownership affects content as it affects placement of individuals
on the editorial board. These studies and anecdotes suggest that at least some
forms of corporate ownership have had an effect on editorial endorsement in the
past. However, the results are confusing and mixed, with some of the same
problems mentioned above with reference to news content; the studies examine
typically small subsets of newspapers or single time periods, capturing either
length or breadth of possible changes but not both.
The mixed message from the opinion page literature is that ownership has
some effect on newspaper political bias measured by endorsements. Consolidation
does not affect marketplace diversity, though corporate ownership affects the
content breakdown of newspapers’ opinion pages. Newspapers with chain owners
are more likely to be politically active in endorsing presidential candidates,
according to Wackman et al. (1975); other studies have found that ownership has
little effect on endorsements (Busterna and Hansen, 1989). Perhaps the answer to
this question depends on what you are looking at, the sample size, and how long
you are lookiing. This circles back to the initial research question and contribution
for this paper, which will examine ownership effects on a large sample of
newspapers over a 30-year time period, capturing both elements of discussion at
8

once.
The ownership effect, if one exists, is not necessarily stationary – a
newspaper’s acquisition by a chain from independent ownership does not effectively
mean the newspaper will endorse the Democratic candidate (or Republican
candidate) regardless of past history and regardless of the owner acquiring it.
Research shows the amount and type of owner effect can vary based on the owner’s
size and corporate quirks. An unpublished study Compaine and Gomery (2000)
cite found that multi-region chains were likely to be less homogeneous than small,
personally managed regional newspaper groups. Compaine and Gomery also
present anecdotes supporting claims that newspaper owners affect editorial
endorsements: William Randolph Hearst demanded that papers support the
Johnson-Humphrey ticket, and the owner of Cox Newspapers required his papers
to support Nixon. These effects based on individual owners could mean that, even
if consolidation does have an effect on presidential endorsements, the results
balance each other out, with impetus to endorse Democrats equalling impetus to
endorse Republicans, giving an overall null effect of ownership on endorsements.
To account for controls used in the present research, a brief account of
consumer effects is called for here. Media consumers as well as media producers
have the potential to influence editorial partisan bias in liberal or conservative
directions. Dalton et al. (1998) found a strong correlation between newspaper and
readership’s political leanings. Hamilton (2004) discusses news content as a
function of audience demand with economic indicators based on readership
demographics dictating the political stance that maximizes a newspaper’s profit
margin. Groseclose and Milyo (2005) measure newspaper bias by comparing
political phrases in the news sections of media outlets with terminology used by
members of Congress. Baron (2006) creates a profit-maximizing bias calculus that
includes influencing factors from readership and advertisers, corporate effects and
9

journalistic standards. Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) find that newspapers in
markets that voted for Bush in 2000 were also more likely to have endorsed the
Republican candidate in that election. Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010) hypothesize
that media slant is related to consumer slant, which they capture with variables
for consumer religiosity (churchgoing), education, minority population, population
density as a measure of the newspaper’s location in a rural or urban market,
population and income. A study of ownership effects which controls for these
variables would encompass the critical elements of potential outside effects on
newspaper content.
While consolidation is documented and accepted in the political science
literature, the relative dearth of research exploring the effects of consolidation on
content begs an investigation, particularly as much of the extant literature is
several decades old and few scholars have attempted large-scale analyses. Given
the amount of ownership consolidation that apparently took place in the 1980s and
1990s (McChesney and Schiller, 2003; George, 2007), a new, large-scale look at
editorial endorsements is in order. This study will examine ownership
consolidation with a new dataset and look at endorsements and ownership across
multiple elections and nearly all English-language daily newspapers in the U.S.
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CHAPTER 2
EXPECTATIONS

The research outlined above leads to the hypothesis for this study.
Research Hypothesis: Based on research linking ownership to content
(Wackman et al., 1975; Rystrom, 1987; Ho and Quinn, 2009), I hypothesize that
there will be a positive relationship between changing newspaper ownership and
changes in presidential endorsement. A change in ownership should make a
newspaper more likely to change its presidential endorsement from the Democratic
to the Republican party, the Republican to the Democratic party, or no
endorsement to either party, in general.
The existing research is murky and does not lead to a direction for this
hypothesis. It could be the case that corporate ideology affects individual
newspaper ideology, leading all Gannett newspapers to endorse Democrats, all
Freedom newspapers to endorse Republican presidential candidates, and so forth.
Or it could be the case that corporate ownership leads a newspaper to be more
liberal in general and thus to endorse the Democratic presidential candidate (as in
Rystrom (1987)). Conversely, the study could show that changes to corporate
ownership make a newspaper more likely to endorse a Republican candidate as
prevailing business interests lead the newspaper to root for the candidate typically
more in favor of corporate interests.
If changing ownership is not linked to changing endorsements, it would imply
that other interests are more influential in a newspaper’s decision to endorse; these
interests could be external, imposed by readership demands, or internally imposed
by editorial structure and ethics of professionalism or personal opinions. I would
anticipate a newspaper to be more likely to endorse the candidate of the party its
readership typically votes for in general. If readership has a reason to be
11

dissatisfied with the current political regime, the newspaper would be more likely
to switch endorsements and endorse the opposing party for president.
If ownership change is linked to changing endorsements this could present
problematic implications for the future of media. If newspaper ownership is really
consolidating and ownership consolidation leads newspapers to change political
ideology, this could reduce the number of competing voices in the field of popular
political opinion. If newspapers change ideology based on ownership and
newspapers’ presidential endorsements have an effect on voting behavior or
influence citizens’ political decision-making and knowledge, this could signal a
problematic amount of corporate influence over individual political decisions.
Control Variables: Since the literature shows a link between newspaper
content and political demographics of the readership, I posit a relationship
between politics-linked demographics and changes in presidential endorsement.
Changing levels of political involvement among media consumers in a newspaper’s
market likely indicate changing levels of political interest. This could lead a
newspaper to switch endorsements, so I expect that political involvement could be
linked to a change in endorsements in the undifferentiated research models.
Research establishes a firm link between economic well-being and political
satisfaction (MacKuen et al., 1992; Conover et al., 1986). Therefore, I expect that
as unemployment rises, a newspaper will be more likely to switch endorsements as
readership grows unhappy with the current political situation and looks for a new
regime to rescue it from its current plight.
The minority voter constituency is also commonly linked to voting behavior.
Based on this link I expect that higher percentages of minority residents in an area
will lead to a higher likelihood of Democratic endorsements by a newspaper.
Increased or decreased vote for the Democratic Party among voters in a
newspaper’s home county indicate a shifting political environment and should also
12

link to changes in endorsement. I hypothesize that an increase in votes for the
Democrat would lead to an increased likelihood of the newspaper endorsing the
Democrat, and vice versa; decreased county-level votes for the Democratic
candidate would raise the likelihood of a newspaper’s switch to a Republican
endorsement.
Finally, an almost expected premise of this research is that I will see
ownership consolidation. Based on numerous studies and popular literature, I
expect that ownership consolidation has indeed taken place over the last 30 years.
That is, the data should show fewer newspaper owners with more newspapers
owned by each company, particularly the largest companies.

13

CHAPTER 3
METHOD

Because the hypotheses outlined above are premised on studying changes –
between owners and between presidential parties in endorsements – a time-series
analysis is appropriate. With a time-series study, events from several time periods
can be examined longitudinally to produce some causal and directional
observations. Data to analyze these hypotheses is panel-style. Five time periods
were observed for each of 1,366 newspapers, so I can compare owner, endorsement
and demographic information for a given newspaper to itself over a 30-year time
span and to other newspapers across the panel. This makes it easier to deduce
whether a change in X leads to a change in Y.
Within the category of time series analyses, several models depend on known
distributions of data and its dependency on time (meaning the risk of an event’s
occurrence either rises or falls predictably as time progresses). The Cox
proportional hazards model does not require this.
Because the dependent variable in this study is an event, the Cox
proportional hazards model, a survival time risk analysis model, is appropriate for
analysis (Blossfeld et al., 2007; Cleves et al., 2008). The model estimates the effect
of independent variables on the risk of a failure in the dependent variable (in this
case, a change in endorsement). The Cox model tests for causality such that “a
change in variable Xt at time t is a cause of a change in variable Yt at a later
point in time, t‘ ” (Blossfeld et al., 2007).
Because the distributional form of the duration time to endorsement change
for each newspaper is unknown, the most suitable method for this analysis is the
Cox model (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004). As Box-Steffensmeier and Jones
explain, the Cox model was derived to produce estimates of the covariates under
14

scrutiny while leaving the duration dependency out of the question. In effect, a
Cox model estimation can address the question, “How do changes in ownership
affect changes in endorsement?” without determining whether or how the
probability of changing endorsement is time-dependent. The risk of a newspaper
changing endorsements may increase over time, with a higher risk value every year
the newspaper endorses the same political party – or the opposite could be the
case, with the risk of endorsement-flopping decreasing as the media outlet endorses
the same party year after year. My data does not include a record of past
newspaper endorsements, and there is no theoretical basis for a shape to the
hazard rate, which would make this a difficult starting point for analysis. A Cox
model bypasses this question.
In a Cox model, the hazard function, which represents the rate of failure at a
given time for the variable, is assumed to be a function of the independent
variables and unknown regression coefficients multiplied by an arbitrary and
unknown function of time (Cox, 1972). The model was developed to assist
actuaries, statisticians who compile life insurance rates, and was designed to
measure hazard propensities of things causing shorter life spans in potential
clients. Results of the Cox models in this thesis are presented as coefficients, not
hazard rates, so they can be read similarly to regression coefficients: The
coefficient indicates the effect (positive or negative) the variable under
consideration has on the hazard of failure, or the likelihood of an event occurring.

15

CHAPTER 4
DATA AND VARIABLE SELECTION

Variables were chosen for this study to best approximate the concepts under
investigation. To avoid problems inherent to measuring corporate influence on
news production (summarized by Gilens and Hertzman (2000)), this study focuses
simply on how changing ownership affects changes in presidential endorsement.
Since presidential endorsements affect voter actions (Ansolabehere et al., 2006;
Kahn and Kenney, 2002; Druckman and Parkin, 2005), this is one area corporate
ownership could have an indirect effect on the political atmosphere in the United
States.
The dependent variable in my analysis, P residential Endorsement Change,
captures change in the presidential candidate endorsement of a newspaper between
1980 and 2008. Newspapers run presidential endorsements in election years just
prior to the November election in an attempt to educate voters on the newspaper’s
view of the best candidate. Editorial staff at the newspaper typically discuss and
compose these editorials, sometimes after interviewing the candidates or even
organizing debates between candidates. Some newspapers, like the
Chicago T ribune, have historical stances they typically adopt; the T ribune
endorsed Republican candidates routinely until breaking from tradition to endorse
Barack Obama in the 2008 presidential race. In a “Statement of Principles” in
2007, the paper’s editorial staff called its values “traditionally conservative:” “The
Tribune believes in the traditional principles of limited government; maximum
individual responsibility; and minimum restriction of personal liberty, opportunity
and enterprise. It believes in free markets, free will and freedom of expression”
(Tribune). Other newspapers have less of a traditional attachment to one party,
and some newspapers (like T he V irginian − P ilot in Norfolk, Va.) do not endorse
16

presidential candidates at all because, as one editor said, the newspaper staff
decided local content and endorsements were more important to its mission than
spending time and resources creating an opinion on a national political race.
Editor & P ublisher, a formerly weekly print magazine that downgraded to
monthly in 2004, collects presidential endorsement data to create a running tally
on its website (for recent elections) and print (for elections prior to 1996). This
data is often self-reported or reported by readers or other newspaper owners who
observe endorsements. The project is a simple tally of newspapers endorsing the
Republican candidate, the Democrat candidate, or making a statement about not
endorsing either. Because the information is self-reported it is likely not
exhaustive. This introduces potential sources of error where a newspaper could be
switching endorsements but not reporting the information to Editor & P ublisher,
but there is no other readily available running tally of presidential endorsements
and other scholars also use Editor & P ublisher as a source for endorsements
(Ansolabehere et al., 2006; Erikson, 1976).
The variable is dichotomous, where 1 represents a change in endorsement and
0 represents no change. In Models 1 and 2, the dependent variable represents any
change in endorsement. In Models 3 and 4, the dependent variable represents a
change to Democratic endorsement, and in Models 5 and 6 the dependent variable
represents change to a Republican endorsement. Using P residential
Endorsement Change minimizes the possibility that external factors are
confounding the effect of change in ownership on content. Missing endorsement
data was coded as ”0.” A switch to a Republican endorsement was coded as 1, and
a switch to a Democratic endorsement was coded as 2. Because there is no way to
check the missing data short of the time-prohibitive option of reading and coding
individual missing newspapers for presidential endorsements prior to elections, it is
possible that some newspapers simply did not report endorsements in certain years
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(coded as 0) and then began reporting endorsing the same party, creating a false
endorsement switch in my data (a ”1” or ”2” where no change really exists).
However, as outlined above, Editor & P ublisher is the only readily available
source for these endorsement data so this is an inherent data limitation to the
current research.
Dependent and key independent variables are both coded as event variables
because they best encapsulate the research question: Does changing ownership
change the content of newspapers? If Freedom Communications Company is more
likely to acquire newspapers with a liberal slant, and therefore endorse Democratic
candidates for president, a regression of ownership on presidential endorsement
could reveal that this owner influences newspaper content. But rather than
indicating that Freedom has a liberalizing effect on its newspapers, this might only
show that Freedom is more likely to acquire a certain type of newspaper (more
liberal). The event variable avoids some of this endogeneity and attempts to
ensure that the study measures the effect of ownership on a change in content, be
it a liberal to conservative change or a conservative to liberal change. Newspaper
endorsements are simple to code and involve little judgement call – the only
options are Republican, Democratic or no endorsement – and research has shown
that newspaper endorsements matter; they increase vote share to the endorsed
candidate (Ansolabehere et al., 2006; Druckman and Parkin, 2005; Kahn and
Kenney, 2002).
Therefore, the key independent variable, Ownership Change Event, is also a
dichotomous change variable. Any change in ownership from the previous year is
coded as 1, and no change is coded as 0.
Data for ownership and endorsement comes from the Editor & P ublisher
International Y earbook, which contains information on the owner and presidential
endorsement of every English-language daily newspaper in the United States
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dating back some time; this study examines 1980 to 2008. This data contains
entries for select years in which there was a presidential election. The years of data
collection were spaced periodically to encompass the 28-year period in which
newspaper ownership changed fairly dramatically, and contains information on
newspapers from 1980, 1988, 1992, 2000 and 2008. Information for this dataset
was collected manually from the Editor & P ublisher International Y earbook for
each year in question. Not all newspapers report endorsement information to
Editor & P ublisher, and absent further analysis and coding it is impossible to
know why this is or if unique factors influence a newspaper’s choice to not report
endorsements – and whether this affects analysis. A switch from no report to an
endorsement is coded as a change, but this could represent a no endorsement to
endorsement change or merely a no report to report change. It is likely that
something changes at the newspaper, though, to prompt a decision to record
information with Editor & P ublisher. Ownership information was manually
coded based on hard copies of Editor & P ublisher. While the data was doubleand triple-checked for possible typographical errors or notational errors that made
one owner company look like two, such errors could contribute to the wild
fluctuation in one-newspaper owners from 1980 to 2008. In addition to coding
errors, the data itself likely contains errors. Several companies in the yearbook
were similar enough that they likely refer to the same owner, but with no external
frame of reference in many cases to check newspaper owner names from 1980 and
even later years, I coded these as separate owners. Editor & P ublisher
Circulation Manager Amelia Salazar said yearbook information is self-reported by
individual newspapers. This could contribute to these discrepancies. Additionally,
from 1980 to 2008 an increasing number of newspapers have owner names which
seem to be incorporations of the individual newspaper and newspapers simply not
reporting an owner dwindled. If this is the case, in essence most or all of the 622
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independent newspapers from 1980 were still independent in 2008, at least in the
sense that they did not share ownership with other newspapers in the country.
This is the first study to examine the effects of ownership by studying the
effect of one event on another event. Because this study focuses on ideology
changes, variables that would be typically linked to ideology are inappropriate in
the main model. It does not make sense to include variables measuring racial
composition of counties in the model that encompasses all endorsement changes,
though this is included in the split model which addresses changes to Republican
and Democratic endorsements separately.
Supporting control variables are chosen to offset potential other factors
affecting changing endorsements (and potentially changing ownership as well).
Research has shown that voting behavior and satisfaction with current political
regimes are linked to economics, both the individuals personal situation and his or
her perception of the economic forecast (MacKuen et al., 1992; Conover et al.,
1986). State U nemployment is an annual percentage variable included to capture
this economic effect. This variable utilizes state-level rather than county-level data
because of data collection limitations; county-level unemployment data through
1980 was not available. Higher levels of unemployment should make a newspaper
more likely to switch its party choice in endorsement. Census and vote share data
was available for use in county-level measurements, so that is the unit employed
here. Survey data from the actual circulation (readership) of a newspaper would
more accurately reflect the specific composition of readership the newspaper’s
editorial board writes to, but this level of data is unavailable and county-level
measurements are the most precise unit available.
Presidential approval reported by Gallup in the month prior to the election
could also affect a newspapers endorsements. I would expect higher presidential
approval in the newspaper’s readership to make a paper less likely to switch party
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in endorsements. If the newspaper’s readership is unhappy with the current
president, the newspaper should be more likely to endorse a different party from
the previous election. Because county- or state-level approval data is not available
back through 1980, national approval data for the month before the November
election is the most accurate measure available. However, as this variable varies
only with the year, it cannot be used in a Cox model.
Models 2, 5 and 8 also include Slant M easure, a non time-varying variable
for the newspapers slant derived by Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010). This variable is
a measurement ranging from 0.346, indicating a liberally slanted newspaper, to
0.585, indicating a conservatively slanted newspaper. A negative slant coefficient
in the models in this thesis would indicate that liberal newspapers are more likely
to change endorsement, while a positive slant coefficient would indicate that
conservative newspapers are more likely to change endorsement. Gentzkow and
Shapiro created slant measures for a sample of 288 newspapers, so including this
variable substantially diminishes the observation pool; hence the variable’s
exclusion in half of this study’s models. The researchers created this measure by
coding newspaper content available in online databases according to specific
phrases also used by members of Congress considered conservative or liberal. A
high use of phrases such as ”private accounts,” ”national wildlife,” ”war in Iraq”
and ”living in poverty,” for example, land a newspaper on the Democrat slant side
of the spectrum, while phrases such as ”stem cell,” ”death tax,” economic growth,”
”food program” and ”human life” garner a Republican slant. The researchers then
compared their slant index to Mondo Times ratings (a website of newspaper
information) for accuracy. Gentzkow and Shapiro’s slant index locates the
Daily Oklahoman, the W all Street Journal and the W ashington T imes on the
conservative, Republican end of the spectrum and the San F rancisco Chronicle
and the Baltimore Sun on the Democratic end of the slant spectrum.
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Change in T urnout and P ercent Dem. V ote come from county-level turnout
and vote share information in a census dataset used in previous research (Nardulli,
2005; Darmofal, 2010). P opulation Density, P ercent Black and P ercent Other
Race, three additional control variables included in some models, also come from
the county-level census dataset. These demographic variables were selected
similarly to the controls for minority population, population and density used by
Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010) in examining newspaper slant. Gentzkow and
Shapiro also include control variables for income, age and education that are not
available for this study. This study utilizes county-level data rather than ZIP
code-level or newspaper market-area data because of limited data availability;
county-level data was the most accurate measurement area available.
Information on the home county of newspapers was gathered from the Audit
Bureau of Circulation – collected by myself with the help of another graduate
student and Dr. Habel – and used to compile the Census 1980, 1990 and 2000 data
for all available newspapers. County-level census data does not exist for Hawaii or
Alaska, so census demographics for newspapers in these states comes from
state-level data. Ideally, this demographic data would be strictly representative of
the newspaper’s readership base, but as directed readership surveys are not
available for all newspapers in the sample, county-level census data is the best
approximation to readership demographics at this time.
Owner Size is a frequency variable created from other existing data. It is a
count variable that represents the number of newspapers held by a company. The
variable is an additive count across all five years of observation, so if a company
owns one newspaper in one year, it would have a size of 1, while owning the same
newspaper for all five years of analysis would yield a count of 5, and so forth.
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This variable was created as the best way of tracking ownership across years and is
valuable in examining the corporate consolidation question, which is addressed in
the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 5
DOES CONSOLIDATION EXIST?

The impact of ownership on newspaper content is unclear in the literature,
and this study seeks to shed new light on the relationship. Ownership could affect
content by causing newspaper editors, reporters and writers to think differently
about what they write or to produce news and opinion content slanted differently
than before. There could also be a more direct effect with company owners issuing
directives or opinions on political candidates that individual opinion page editors
account account for when choosing which presidential candidate to endorse. If this
is the case, the high percentage of ownership changes among U.S. daily newspapers
over the last 30 years could give reason for concern (see Table 4). However, if
ownership changes are not leading to consolidation (with fewer companies owning
a larger share of the news market), then the changes could represent little more
than a series of highway lane changes, rather than a funnel that conglomerates
news opinion into fewer possible outlets and voices. If consolidation is not
happening, the link between ownership and content may be less of a concern
because the free market of opinion, though changing, is not limited.
It is also significant to note the directional changes incurred by changing
ownership. If ownership change is linked to endorsement changes to one party over
the other rather than bipartisan switching, this could say something about the
political ideology and political interests of the corporations acquiring new media
outlets. And if this change counterbalances non ownership-linked endorsement
changes, it could further strengthen the marketplace of ideas rather than
diminishing it as some scholars fear.
In the preface to the 6th edition of T he M edia M onopoly, Bagdikian writes
“The country’s largest media giants have achieved alarming success in writing the
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media laws and regulations in favor of their own corporations and against the
interests of the general public. Their concentrated power permits them to become
a larger factor than ever before in socializing each generation with entertainment
models of behavior and personal values.” He points to coverage of specific events
and items such as the national debt and budget deficit as an example of overblown
political coverage resulting from corporate budget interests by newspaper owners
(Bagdikian, 2000, viii). However, Bagdikian’s “Top Six” largest media companies
by revenue are nowhere in the tables (below) of largest newspaper corporations:
Time Warner, Disney, Viacom (an amalgam of CBS and Westinghouse), News
Corp, Bertelsmann, and General Electric (Bagdikian, 2000, x). Mergers deteriorate
news and turn it into a “handmaiden of its owners’ corporate ambitions,”
Bagdikian says, citing the Los Angeles T imes as an example. The Times Mirror
Corporation was acquired by The Tribune Company in 2000, resulting in a
“culture clash,” according to the N ew Y ork T imes (Holson and Waxman).
Bagdikian also links major corporations to conservative political interests, implying
that colors corporately-owned newspapers’ politics in coverage and opinion.
These claims are significant if true, and Bagdikian claims family ownership of
newspapers has declined significantly, from 75 percent of newspapers in 1946 to
less than 2 percent in 2000. However, much of Bagdikian’s research and example
data comes from broadcast media and book publishing, not the world of print,
even though print media has been lumped in the same category in resulting
ownership and bias studies. This makes a look at the ownership data of
newspapers relevant to this study.
This and the following chapter present models created using the previous
chapter’s variables designed to examine the effect of changing ownership on
changing newspaper endorsements. Appendix 1 presents summary statistics of
data and results along with the results of Cox model analyses. This chapter will
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address the background question of ownership consolidation in the media with
summary statistics of the data collected, and Chapter 6 will present results of nine
models examining the relationship between changing ownership and endorsements.
If a media monopoly does exist, longevity is not any corporation’s strong
point. Table 1 presents all owners with more than 100 newspapers to their name
over the five-point analysis period. This could mean the company owns around 20
newspapers without fluctuating over the 28 years in my sample. An example here
would be Freedom Communications Inc., which owns 22 newspapers in 1980 and
only grows by five by 2008. The other extreme is Media News Inc., which did not
exist in 1980 and owns 56 newspapers by 2008. Thomson Newspapers is yet
another possible case, with a peak ownership of 101 newspapers in 1992 and
nonexistence in 2008. Only about half of the corporations which own the largest
amount of newspapers across the sample are the most prominent in any given year
– other companies swoop in and out, competing for ownership of the most
newspapers in any given year (as an example, note Gatehouse Media, which owns
95 newspapers in 2008 but none in any of the previous years of observation). A
shifting base of mass ownership could be less concerning than a solid and stable
ownership base; if ownership is really linked to political content and endorsements,
then the underlying corporate bias would likely change with each owner and still
represent a marketplace of ideas, unless corporate ownership in general is linked to
one particular political party.
About half of the five largest newspaper companies in each year of analysis
are not repeated in previous or subsequent years, indicating a shifting base of
corporate power in the print media realm. Table 2 presents the five largest
newspaper companies in each year independent of other years. This is more
indicative of consolidation than the first. The biggest owners change year to year –
Gannett is the only one that shows up in each year – but each biggest company
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owns about twice as many papers in 2008 as in 1980. The percent of newspapers
owned by the top five also doubles, from 12.5 percent in 1980 to 27 percent in
2008. However, this accounts for only 200 of the 430 newspapers lost from the
“independent” sample. By this evidence, newspaper companies are acquiring more
newspapers but are also shifting in and out of power and top positions of ownership
fairly frequently; there is no real evidence of a company that stays strong across
the last 30 years and also acquires enough newspapers to place among the top five
owners. Gannett is the only company that ranks among the largest every year,
and while its newspaper acquisitions double over the 30 year span at the highest
measurement in 2008 it owns only six percent of all U.S. daily newspapers.
Two things stand out in 1 and 2. First, Table 1 presents no dramatic
evidence of ownership consolidation. The companies with the most ownership
across decades are not the largest companies in any given year. Two of those
disappear – Donrey Media and Thomson Newspapers – but the other four
companies own only 214 newspapers between them. This does represent growth
from the 162 newspapers owned between five companies in 1980, but given that
my data sample includes more than 1,300 newspapers and is limited to daily,
English-language newspapers, this hardly seems to provide evidence for a theory of
a dangerous level of media consolidation. The fact that these owners only increase
their newspaper holdings by 52 also begs the question of what happens to the
“Independent” sample. These are newspapers that record their existence with
Editor & Publisher but did not provide ownership information. Clearly, this
sample shrinks dramatically and consistently from 622 papers in 1980 to 190
papers in 2008. But also clearly, this sample of more than 400 newspapers is not
absorbed into large ownership conglomerations.
Mid-size companies, owning a smaller share of the market but still more than
one newspaper, are also worth considering as possible targets in a consolidation
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hypothesis. Perhaps large newspapers companies are trading holdings and moving
in and out of the top five list but mid-size owners with between two and 50
newspapers to their name are consolidating and merging to form fewer companies
and leave less diversity on the table. Table 3 shows the number of companies
holding two to 50 newspapers from 1980 to 2008 and the total number of
newspapers owned by such companies. These companies nearly doubled their
collective holdings from 268 newspapers in 1980 to 486 newspapers in 2008, which
could account for 218 of the independent newspapers. These data are compiled
from the whole 30-year period, so not all 268 companies listed in 1980 necessarily
own 50 newspapers in 1980 – but they own at least one, and fewer than the large
companies. This number nearly doubles over the 30-year span, suggesting possible
evidence for a proliferation of small to mid-size companies over the past 30 years,
rather than large newspaper corporations. The number of newspaper companies
holding one newspaper – essentially incorporated independent newspaper entities –
is very large and not shown but exhibits no clear trend. The increase in the number
of mid-size companies, though, provides, if anything, evidence against ownership
consolidation, as consolidation would imply fewer companies owning more
newspapers, rather than more companies owning small numbers of newspapers.
While the argument for ownership consolidation seems tenuous based on my
data, evidence for changes in ownership is clearly evident in Table 4 Because 1980
is my earliest time point I cant compare ownership changes from previous years,
but from 1980 to 1988 nearly 400 papers – almost one-third of the
English-language daily newspaper universe – changed owners. From 1988 to 1992
nearly one-sixth of the sample changed owners, and from 1992 to 2000 and 2000 to
2008 nearly half of the sample reported a change in ownership. Though this does
not present compelling evidence of ownership consolidation, it should provide
ample opportunity to test my hypotheses based on changes in ownership. Table 5
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tabulates the number of unique newspaper owners each year. This number dips
slightly from 1980 to 2008 but by the end of the measurement period there are
more unique owners than there were in 1980. This indicates that, though
acquisitions are occurring and documented by media outlets, the companies going
out of business or being acquired are being replaced by others to maintain a
potentially diverse marketplace of opinion and ideas in the world of media
information.
My data is not designed nor collected to examine family ownership versus
corporate newspaper ownership, so can shed no light on Bagdikian’s claim that
family ownership is disappearing from the newspaper market. The data does,
however, show the overall composition of newspaper owners and the number of
newspapers owned by the largest companies by year. Without circulation analysis
it is difficult to tell precisely what share of the media market is held by each
company and how this has changed over time, but it is notable that an
overwhelming percentage of the daily newspapers in the U.S. are still not owned
by the largest conglomerates that Bagdikian and others warn against. However,
ownership change certainly takes place in high percentages. Does this have an
effect on political stances? This is the subject of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 6
AND DOES IT MATTER?

The previous chapter provided an overview of ownership change over the past
30 years and established that ownership change has indeed taken place, though
consolidation is not as clearly documented. If ownership change is linked to
changing political parties in endorsements, there are many opportunities for
concern as at least one-third of the newspapers in the U.S. have changed
ownership over the past five years alone, let alone the past three decades. If
changing ownership has an effect on endorsements, the political terrain of
newspapers could be shifting dramatically in ways that affect the political opinions
available to the public.
This chapter examines changes in endorsement and provides results of nine
models analyzing the effect of ownership change on endorsement changes. Tables 6
through 8 in the Appendix provide summary statistics and Tables 9 through 11
tabulates the results of the nine Cox models.

1

To give an overview of the data under analysis in this study, Table 6
tabulates the data: There are 6,830 observations of 1,366 newspapers, spread out
over five time periods from 1980 to 2008. The first year’s data cannot be included
in analysis because of limitations of the Cox model, leaving 5,467 observations
capable of failure, or switching endorsements. There are 466 failures in the data.
It is also helpful to view the endorsement changes by party. A tabulation of
this information shows that newspapers have overwhelmingly switched to
Democratic endorsements in the past 30 years, among newspapers that switch
endorsements; the vast majority of newspapers do not switch endorsements in any
1

Appendix 2 addresses the question of owner effects and endorsement with an entirely different

analysis technique – a multinomial logit operation.
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given year. Table 7 breaks down P residential Endorsement Change by party.
Three hundred ninety-eight newspapers switch endorsements to the Democratic
party over the observation period and 68 switch to Republican. The other 6,364
observations exhibit no change. This is due either to a newspaper’s actual
stationary endorsement pattern, or to data limitations as described above.
Whether the small number of endorsement changes is due to newspapers’ failure to
report endorsements or their single-party voting record, though, the small number
of papers with reported endorsement changes makes an interesting comparison
with the large total sample. These data results indicate that only 7.3 percent of
English-language daily newspapers in the U.S. switch parties in presidential
endorsements.2
Another possibility is that the size of the company acquiring the newspaper
has an effect on whether or not the newspapers switches endorsement party. The
data shows this to be the case. Table 8 lists P residential Endorsement Change
by year and owner size, divided into three groups: Large Owners hold more than
100 newspapers over the analysis time; M id − Size Owners hold between 50 and
100 newspapers; and Small Owners hold fewer than 50 newspapers from 1980 to
2008. The unique survivor functions of each paper size and year – essentially the
constant for that group – is also listed. From this table, data shows that
newspapers owned by small companies have a higher survivor function, which
means a lower hazard rate, than large owners. These newspapers are less likely to
2

A future research question is whether these newspapers repeatedly endorse the same party for

president or, alternatively, do not endorse presidential candidates at all. In a recent conversation,
a journalism colleague mentioned T he V irginian P ilot stopped endorsing presidential candidates
some years ago because staff felt the endorsement was meaningless and irrelevant to local news,
and that newspaper staff at a local paper are ill equipped to judge a presidential candidate’s
qualifications.
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switch endorsement than newspapers owned by larger companies. Table 8
highlights this with the difference between failures expected and observed for each
size category (Large, M id − Size and Small). The results in these two tables
show that endorsement changes happen at different rates than the expected
random occurrence for each size group, suggesting that corporation size has an
effect on whether or not a newspaper changes endorsements. Mid-size ownership
groups had about the expected number of endorsement changes, with 113 changes
observed and 111 expected. Large companies show 24 more endorsement changes
than expected (206 vs. 182), and newspapers owned by small companies had only
147 endorsement changes, 26 fewer than the expected 173. This suggests that large
corporations have more control over the endorsements of the newspapers in their
holdings.
In a Cox model, significance indicates that the variable under consideration
has a statistically significant effect on the hazard rate of the variable under
observation (in this case, the newspaper ID) undergoing the event (endorsement
change). Tables 9 through 11 present the results of nine Cox models. Each table
presents three models for the given condition: the reduced sample size created by
adding the slant variable but without the variable; the model with the slant
variable; and the complete sample without the slant variable.
The results show that newspapers that switch owner are significantly more
likely to switch to a Republican endorsement, but ownership change has no effect
on Democratic endorsements. Population affects all endorsement changes;
newspapers in more populated areas are more likely to switch endorsements.
Control variables for race and minority population in newspapers’ home counties
seem to have reversed signs from what would theoretically drive more Republican
or Democratic endorsements; but perhaps this is because the newspapers in areas
with high minority populations already typically endorse Democrats so have fewer
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opportunities to switch endorsements to the Democratic party.
I present results for three coding methods of my dependent variable,
P residential Endorsement Change: the first two models use a variable that
captures a failure every time the endorsement changes, regardless of political
party. These models are labeled U ndif f erentiated. These models thus capture all
466 endorsement changes in the data.
The second set of models, Democrat, measures P residential Endorsement
Change as an event occurrence only if a newspaper switched to a Democrat
endorsement from either no endorsement or a Republican endorsement. This
model captures 398 endorsement changes to Democrat in the data.
Finally, the third set of models, Republican, accounts for P residential
Endorsement Change as the event of a Republican endorsement following no
endorsement or a Democrat endorsement. there are 68 such changes in the data.
In U ndif f erentiated Models 1, 2 and 3 P opulation Density, P ercent Black
and P ercent Other Race were omitted. These demographics are linked to specific
partisan voting behavior (urban communities with a large minority population are
more likely to vote Democrat; rural, white communities are more likely to vote for
Republican candidates). Since the undifferentiated model attempts to explain
partisan shifts in both directions, using control variables linked to specific partisan
behavior is theoretically nonsensical.
In Model 1, county population has a small but significant positive effect on
the probability of an endorsement change, so – all else being equal – newspapers in
higher population areas are more likely to change endorsements than otherwise, as
are newspapers with a positive change in turnout. Owner Change, Owner Size
and U nemployment variables are all insignificant in this model.
In Model 2, with the addition of Slant M easure, the sample under
observation shrinks from 1,348 newspapers to 288, and the number of endorsement
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changes drops from 262 to 150. With the slant measure addition, Owner Change
becomes significant; this trend is repeated across all six models.
From the results of the undifferentiated models in Table 9, it seems changing
ownership affects the party of presidential endorsements when the newspaper’s
individual editorial slant is accounted for, though ownership change is not
significantly linked to changing endorsements without a newspaper slant variable.
This suggests that individual newspaper editorial boards have a stronger control
over their newspaper’s content than the corporate owners, but across newspapers
with equivalent levels of slant, a change in ownership would make a newspaper
more likely to change presidential endorsements. Absent the Slant M easure
variable, Change In T urnout also has a highly significant effect on changing
endorsements; higher turnout makes a newspaper more likely to switch presidential
parties in endorsements. As higher turnout presumably signals more political
interest in a given year, it makes sense that a newspaper would be more politically
conscious and prone to examining candidates and possibly switching endorsement
parties in such years.
Newspapers that switch to Democratic endorsements are analyzed in Models
4, 5 and 6 in Table 10. Here, P ercent Dem V ote is significant in all three models,
indicating that a higher vote share for the Democratic party in the newspaper’s
home county is linked to a higher possibility of switching to endorse a Democratic
presidential candidate. In the full sample of Model 6, State U nemployment and
Logged P opulation are also significant, indicating that statewide unemployment
and the population of the newspaper’s home county also have an effect on
switching endorsements. The coefficient for unemployment is negative, indicating
that increasing unemployment in the state decreases the likelihood of a newspaper
switching parties in a presidential endorsement. The positive coefficient associated
with population indicates that a higher county population make a newspaper more
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likely to switch endorsements to a Democratic candidate.
Slant changes the story somewhat. When the slant measure is added in
Model 5, only P ercent Dem. V ote and Slant M easure are significant. The slant
measure has a negative coefficient, indicating that as a newspaper becomes more
conservative (moves higher on the slant scale), it is less likely to switch parties to
endorse a Democratic presidential candidate. Percent Democratic vote is still
positive, indicating that a higher Democratic vote share increases the likelihood of
a newspaper switching endorsements to a Democrat. In the reduced sample
without the slant measure, Democratic vote share is still the only significant
measure. This indicates that something about the newspapers Gentzkow and
Shapiro selected for the vote share measure makes them respond to politics and
endorsements differently than the general sample of newspapers in the U.S.
Perhaps newspapers large and sophisticated enough to have searchable archives on
Lexis-Nexis and other databases have more well-developed infrastructure and are
more financially stable, therefore are less dependent on the economy and care less
about the effect of a particular party on it.
The Democrat models indicate that Owner Change is not a significant
predictor of whether a newspaper will switch presidential endorsement to the
Democratic Party. The Democratic endorsement is dependent on the percent of
Democratic voters in the newspaper’s home county and the slant measure.
Newspapers switching to Democratic endorsements are, apparently, more
strong-willed than their Republican-switching counterparts, which are significantly
influenced by changes in ownership. Or, from the ownership perspective, one could
argue that these results show newspaper corporations are more likely to impose
conservative rather than liberal political restrictions on company newspapers. This
suggests an interesting discussion related to political economy in media. Does
corporate ownership bring an automatic (potentially Republican)
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business-favorable slant with it? This is another topic to address in future research
which could examine directional changes in endorsement linked to specific
companies.
Models 7, 8 and 9 in Table 11 analyze newspapers that switch to Republican
endorsements. There are 53 of these changes in the data.
These models indicate that ownership change is linked to Republican
endorsements. Within the whole newspaper sample, represented in Model 9 –
which does not contain Slant M easure – four variables are significant.
Owner Change is significant with a positive coefficient, indicating that
newspapers with ownership changes are more likely to switch to Republican
endorsements than otherwise. P ercent Dem. V ote is significant with a positive
coefficient, indicating that newspapers in counties with high percentages of
Democrat voters are more likely to switch endorsements to Republican. However,
this variable is also significant in the same direction as a predictor for switching to
Democratic endorsements, so it appears to be an undependable indicator of
changing endorsements. Perhaps P ercent Dem. V ote is capturing another quality
such as political engagement or open-mindedness that makes a population group
simply more likely to accept different political parties, whether Democratic or
Republican. P opulation has a positive and significant coefficient, indicating that
newspapers in high population counties have a higher likelihood of switching
endorsement to a Republican candidate than those in low-population areas.
P ercent Black has a positive coefficient, indicating that newspapers in
counties with high percentages of black residents are more likely to switch to
Republican endorsements. Like the percent Democrat voters in Model 4, this is
counterintuitive, but could mean that counties with high percentages of black
residents generally do not contain Republican-endorsing newspapers, so have a
greater chance to switch endorsements to the Republican Party than papers in
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low-black areas that consistently endorse Republican.
Finally, Models 7 and 8 present the coefficients of a model predicting hazard
rates of switching to Republican endorsements with the reduced sample created by
adding Slant M easure to the analysis; Model 8 includes the measure, while Model
7 does not. In this model, Owner Change, P opulation, and the minority
population control variables are significant. P ercent Other Race contains the
Hispanic population, which presumably comprise a large percentage of the total
measure and traditionally votes for Democratic candidates, so it is interesting that
the coefficient is large and negative, indicating that counties with a larger
percentage of non-black minorities are less likely to switch to Republican
endorsements. The slant measure addition and the reduction in sample size do not
affect the significant variables, and Slant M easure itself is not significant. This
indicates that slant does not affect a newspaper’s decision to endorse Republican,
but changing ownership does, as does the minority population of a county.
Models 7, 8 and 9 indicate that changing ownership has a significant, positive
effect on newspaper changes to Republican endorsements. As noted above this
could be indicative of political leanings of large corporations as Republican entities
(though this would defy the popular notion that the mass media is liberal). It
could mean that changing ownership is simply not a determining factor to editors
who decide to switch to a Democrat endorsement for a given presidential election.
It could also be a fluke as a function of the small number of newspapers that do
switch endorsements to Republican (only 68 out of the 466). Or it could mean
something altogether different. Future research can address the meaning further.
Population is a significant predictor of endorsement change in both Republican
models; increasing population makes a newspaper more likely to switch to a
Republican endorsement (as opposed to less likely to switch to a Democratic
endorsements, in Model 4).
37

Overall, results are mixed. The owner change variable, the key explanatory
variable in this thesis, is a significant predictor in three of my six models, two of
which also contain the slant measure that diminishes the sample by more than 80
percent. The slant measure also increases the significance of the owner change
measure when added to model 5. Why is there such a strong apparent connection
between owner change and the slant measure? Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010)
coded a slant index for 433 newspapers from available online databases, and
further diminished the sample to 290 whose circulation area contained at least one
ZIP code with circulation data from the Audit Bureau of Circulations and a large
number of donors listed in the FEC database. It is possible this sampling method
selected a disproportionate number of newspapers located in politically active or
urban areas, since the authors needed a large number of donors to political
campaigns. If this is the case, it would mean a subsample of newspapers in
politically active areas are more likely to change endorsement when ownership
changes, while the average U.S. daily newspaper is less dependent on ownership
oversight to make presidential endorsements.
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CHAPTER 7
RESEARCH POSSIBILITIES AND CONCLUSION

This research analyzes the effect of ownership change on changes in
newspapers’ presidential endorsements. As the previous research indicated, the
situation is complicated. Changing ownership affects changes in endorsement when
only switches to Republican endorsement are considered; they also affect
endorsement changes when the sample size is reduced to the set of newspapers
with slant variables collected by Gentzow and Shapiro. Changing ownership does
not, however, have a blanket effect on changing endorsements. The implication is
that newspapers’ individual biases are also significant, perhaps more significant, in
determining the newspaper’s endorsement choice. Results indicate that ownership
does have an effect on this measure of newspaper content when the editorial slant
of individual newspapers is accounted for. This suggests that, as Bagdikian,
Chomsky and others feared, ownership consolidation might indeed be a legitimate
source of concern for the future of a free marketplace of ideas in the U.S., though
not across the board.
New media poses an interesting challenge to these results. The marketplace of
ideas that Bagdikian and others argued will be limited by ownership consolidation
has less restriction with the rise of the online world. New media like Twitter,
blogs, Facebook and websites like the Huffington Post and other blogs broaden the
marketplace. The lower cost of production associated with online content makes
online production less dependent on advertising and economic benefits to succeed.
Though online-based corporations are still advertising-dependent to pay staff, they
do not require startup costs to purchase printing equipment, nor do they need to
pay for paper, delivery or other printing costs that daily newspapers and other
print outlets must contend with.
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The fact that changes to Republican endorsements are linked to ownership
change presents an interesting conclusion as well, and one in line with Bagdikian’s
concern that corporate concerns are typically conservative, Republican interests. If
newspapers being acquired by corporations are more likely to endorse Republicans
but not more likely to endorse Democrats, this could imply that more
corporately-owned papers tilt the field of newspaper endorsements toward the
Republican party. However, the rest of the endorsement data suggests that other
endorsement changes balance out the corporately-influenced Republican
endorsements. Overall, there were 466 endorsement changes over the 30-year time
period I analyzed. Of these, only 68 were switches to Republican candidates; the
other 398 changes were switches to Democratic endorsements. If the overall trend
in newspapers is to switch to presidential endorsements for the Democratic
candidate, then the switches to Republican endorsement provide a needed balance
to the current political spectrum of newspapers.
Further research should refine the presidential endorsement measure, ideally
extending it to a measure of all endorsements in a given election year. This would
offer a wider range of precision as several endorsements per newspaper would lend
to a percentage variable rather than a dichotomous variable, and many more
possible party change events would exist. Besides the addition of a more nuanced
endorsement variable, future research should explore the partisan nature of
newspaper owners and the link between owner and newspaper partisanship. Some
companies are probably more likely to incur Republican to Democratic
endorsement changes in their papers, and some will be more likely to incur
Democratic to Republican changes. This could be captured with dummy variables
for each company. Directional changes for each company could be created from
public records information of campaign contributions and news reports (Gentzkow
and Shapiro, 2010).
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One serious limitation that seems to hobble all media research, the current
work included, is the problem of endogeneity. As with all media studies, cause and
effect are difficult to separate for study. Does ownership by specific corporations
cause a newspaper to create a more liberal opinion page, or do certain
conglomerates choose to purchase newspapers that are already more liberal and
closer to the company’s political slant? I hope to have addressed these issues
somewhat with my use of event variables as my key variables, but no variable is
perfect and there are always ways to improve and clarify data collection and
analysis. This question could be answered, or at least studied, with an in depth
case study but is difficult to parse out with the results of a statistical analysis.
This research began with the question, “Does changing ownership have an
effect on presidential endorsements?” The results of nine Cox proportional hazards
models spanning more than 1,300 newspapers and nearly 30 years, constructed
with control variables used by other researchers and others collected and coded for
this project, indicate that ownership does indeed have an effect on media content
by way of, at least, presidential endorsements. This effect is not unilateral, though;
it is party-oriented. Ownership change is linked specifically to decisions to endorse
Republican presidential candidates. If ownership changes are typically small to
large businesses, this would indicate the “big business” interests are influencing
content production at corporately-owned newspapers. However, the data suggests
that at least the very large companies are not acquiring all that many newspapers,
and certainly not enough to account for the 503 changes in ownership between
2000 and 2008. So if big business is not the guiding factor in these decisions, does
the data simply imply that selling a newspaper to another business has a blanket
conservative effect on the staff? This is another side to the question, and one less
studied and proposed by media scholars in general. Perhaps changing ownership
results in endorsement changes to Republican candidates not because the owners
41

want their interests addressed and needs met by the prevailing government regime,
but because the newspaper staff themselves wish to see their owners succeed and
themselves not put out of business in the next acquisition or merger.
This suggests that context always matters; newspapers undergoing ownership
changes can and likely do strive for autonomy, but the opinions of corporate
owners trickle down, or editor interests trickle up, to impact the slant of
newspaper output. Whether owner-induced changes are “better” or “worse” than
before depends on who’s asking and what’s being measured, but this research
suggests that the reality of owner-induced change is a – somewhat slanted – fact.
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: TABLES

Table 1. Owners of more than 100 newspapers by year, across years

1980

1988

1992

2000

2008

Total

Donrey Media

27

46

47

12

-

132

Freedom Communications Inc.

22

23

22

25

27

119

Independent?

622

444

374

227

190

1,857

Lee Enterprises Inc.

11

16

18

21

46

112

Media News Inc.

-

3

2

53

56

114

Thomson Newspapers

53

82

101

46

-

282

Gannett Co. Inc.

49

69

67

71

85

341

No record of newspaper

89

55

42

17

29

232

47

Table 2. Largest newspaper companies by year – five largest in each year

1980

1988

1992

2000

2008

Gannett Co. Inc.

49

69

67

71

85

Thomson Newspapers

53

82

101

46

Donrey Media

27

46

47

Freedom Communications Inc.

22

Newhouse

20

Knight Ridder

25

New York Times Co.

24

American Publishing Co.

52

Park Newspapers Group

29

Community Newspaper Holdings

92

Liberty Publishing

58

Media News Inc.

53

56

Gatehouse

95

Community News Inc.

88

Lee Enterprises Inc.

46

48

Table 3. Mid-size newspaper companies by year – holding 2 to 50 newspapers

1980

268

1988

368

1992

355

2000

462

2008

486

Table 4. Newspapers changing ownership by year

1980

-

1980-1988

398

1988-1992

196

1992-2000

648

2000-2008

503

Table 5. Number of unique owners by year

Number of Owners

1980

1988

1992

2000

2008

102

79

97

87

111

49

Table 6. Summary of survival time data

Total Observations

6,830

Measurable Observations

5,464

Total Failures

466

Number of Subjects

1,366

Observation Time

1980-2008

Table 7. Changes in endorsement

To Democrat

398

To Republican

68

No Change

6,364

Observation Total

6,830
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Table 8. Log-rank test for equality of survivor functions

Events Observed

Events Expected

Large (>100 papers)

206

182.49

Mid-size (50-100 papers)

113

110.97

Small (<50 papers)

147

172.54

Total Failures

466

466

Pr>chi2=0.0205

51

Table 9. Results of undifferentiated Cox analyses

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Owner Change
P-value
Standard Error

0.5690
0.003
0.1925

0.5040
0.008
0.1895

0.2282
0.156
0.1609

Logged Owner Size
P-value
Standard Error

0.0360
0.443
0.0469

0.03739
0.421
0.04642

0.04421
0.196
0.0342

State Unemployment
P-value
Standard Error

-0.08344
0.318
0.08357

-0.01087
0.198
0.0843

-0.1319
0.022
0.0574

Change in Turnout
P-value
Standard Error

1.0755
0.619
2.16068

0.7796
0.720
2.1714

4.202
0.035
1.991

Logged Population
P-value
Standard Error

0.2228
0.003
0.07376

0.1534
0.032
0.07176

0.4654
0.000
0.04391

Slant Measure
P-value
Standard Error

-

-5.7348
0.017
2.3986

-

Wald Statistic
Prob>Chi2
Sample size
Number of failures

15.78
0.0075
288
149

20.23
0.0025
288
149

127.18
0.000
1348
261
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Table 10. Results of Cox analyses – change to Democrat

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Owner Change
P-value
Standard Error

0.1065
0.651
0.2357

0.0502
0.830
0.2337

-0.10056
0.615
0.1999

Logged Owner Size
P-value
Standard Error

0.0100
0.842
0.0503

0.01211
0.808
0.04983

0.04601
0.221
0.03761

State Unemployment
P-value
Standard Error

-0.0969
0.257
0.08546

-0.1246
0.142
0.08479

-0.1990
0.001
0.05737

Percent Dem. Vote
P-value
Standard Error

0.04351
0.000
0.01071

0.0386
0.001
0.01112

0.04264
0.000
0.007868

Logged Population
P-value
Standard Error

0.02065
0.817
0.0893

-0.02624
0.760
0.08606

0.3214
0.000
0.05366

Population Density (100,000)
P-value
Standard Error

0.511
0.472
0.710

0.553
0.760
0.627

0.661
0.435
0.846

Percent Black
P-value
Standard Error

-0.5293
0.539
0.8607

-1.4286
0.133
0.9510

-0.3272
0.593
0.6117

Percent Other Minority
P-value
Standard Error

-2.726
0.145
1.8693

-3.2239
0.098
1.9462

-0.9161
0.429
1.1586

Slant Measure
P-value
Standard Error

-

-7.3440
0.017
3.0645

-

Wald Statistic
Prob>Chi2
Sample size
Number of failures

25.24
0.0014
288
117

30.70
0.0003
288
117

130.17
0.000
1348
209
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Table 11. Results of Cox analyses – change to Republican

Model 7

Model 8

Model 9

Owner Change
P-value
Standard Error

1.4986
0.000
0.20128

1.530
0.000
0.4095

0.9773
0.002
0.3221

Logged Owner Size
P-value
Standard Error

0.1022
0.352
0.1098

0.1043
0.350
0.1117

-0.02958
0.692
0.07462

State Unemployment
P-value
Standard Error

0.1605
0.415
0.1969

0.1696
0.379
0.1928

0.1866
0.135
0.1247

Percent Dem. Vote
P-value
Standard Error

-0.00259
0.895
0.01952

0.000525
0.979
0.0196

0.008486
0.511
0.01247

Logged Population
P-value
Standard Error

0.8141
0.000
0.1925

0.8307
0.000
0.1845

0.7613
0.000
0.1224

Population Density (100,000)
P-value
Standard Error

1.13
0.325
1.15

1.29
0.286
1.21

0.116
0.915
1.09

Percent Black
P-value
Standard Error

0.6839
0.663
1.5711

1.3474
0.401
1.6029

2.2755
0.026
1.019

Percent Other Minority
P-value
Standard Error

-11.693
0.006
4.2389

-11.686
0.009
4.468

-6.9813
0.042
3.436

Slant Measure
P-value
Standard Error

-

5.1603
0.488
7.4343

-

Wald Statistic
Prob>Chi2
Sample size
Number of failures

30.57
0.0002
288
33

36.39
0.000
288
33

80.67
0.000
1348
53

54

Table 12. Results of Multinomial Logit

Switch to Dem

Switch to Rep

Owner Change
P-value
Standard Error

0.0626
0.800
0.2478

1.8582
0.000
0.4155

Logged Owner Size
P-value
Standard Error

0.01363
0.806
0.05546

0.09748
0.370
0.1086

State Unemployment
P-value
Standard Error

0.01504
0.792
0.05709

-0.1375
0283
0.1281

Percent Dem. Vote
P-value
Standard Error

0.04128
0.001
0.01228

0.01045
0.645
0.02271

Logged Population
P-value
Standard Error

0.02544
0.819
0.1114

0.9943
0.000
0.2234

Population Density (100,000)
P-value
Standard Error

1.15
0.242
9.86

1.88
0.000
1.80

Percent Black
P-value
Standard Error

-1.5923
0.134
1.0637

1.4317
0.447
1.8842

Percent Other Minority
P-value
Standard Error

-5.2881
0.017
2.2056

-13.5165
0.011
5.3428

Slant Measure
P-value
Standard Error

-7.2646
0.017
3.3239

4.9898
0.427
6.2832

Constant
P-value
Standard Error

-0.4694
0.848
2.4553

-18.8781
0.000
4.7798

Pseudo R2
Log Likelihood
Number of observations

0.0900
-433.95
859

0.0900
-433.95
859
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